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Based on a realist conceptualization of interests, this paper explores how commercial and scientiﬁc
priorities appear to have converged and diverged during the development of the antidepressant Zelmid.
The drug represents the ﬁrst of the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) to reach the market.
Zelmid was synthesized in 1971 and launched by the Swedish ﬁrm Astra in 1982, but subsequently
withdrawn the next year because of adverse neurological effects. This paper draws on in-depth in-
terviews with scientists representing both industry and academia who had high-level involvement in
various phases of the project (experimental, pre-clinical and clinical), as well as on textual sources such
as scientiﬁc articles and memoirs. Zelmid was a product of mechanism-based or “rational” drug dis-
covery from the early 1960s and the associated intermingling of science and commerce. It is argued that
both scientists and the pharmaceutical company shared an interest in embracing mechanism-based drug
discovery because it simultaneously promised medico-scientiﬁc advances and proﬁts. However, the
intermingling of science and commerce also strained the relationship between scientiﬁc and commercial
priorities further along the trajectory of the drug; for example, concerning issues such as dosage strategy
and drug use in primary care, where corporate management allegedly took decisions contrary to the
recommendations of both academic and company scientists. On such occasions the asymmetry in power
became apparent in scientists' narratives: commercial considerations trumped those of science since,
ultimately, decisions rest with management, not with scientists. In addition, temporality appears to be
associated with the divergence of commercial and scientiﬁc priorities. While rare during experimental
and pre-clinical phases, divergence was concentrated downstream to the clinical testing and post-
marketing phases. It is hypothesized that a similar pattern of convergence and divergence of commer-
cial and scientiﬁc priorities may exist in the trajectory of other drugs.
© 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
For the social sciences a fascinating property of pharmaceuticals
is how they connect multiple social groups within our highly
technological societies. This includes the various professionals
involved in drug discovery and evaluation, the companies respon-
sible for production and marketing, the authorities responsible for
regulation, as well as the doctors who prescribe these drugs and the
patients who take them (Gaudilliere, 2005). This paper brings
together two partially overlapping strands of social scienceund University, Box 117, 221
td. This is an open access article uresearch on pharmaceuticals. One is concerned with the values and
priorities in drug research and development (R&D) (Sismondo,
2004); the other with the historical trajectory of speciﬁc drugs
(Gaudilliere, 2005). Regarding the ﬁrst strand, one major concern
rests with the intermingling of science and commerce (Rasmussen,
2004), including the resultant possibilities and perils, especially
related to pharmaceuticals innovation (Achilladelis and Antonakis,
2001) and the public health repercussions of prioritizing the in-
terests of commerce over science (Abraham, 2008). Regarding the
latter, the focus has been on detailing drug histories and viewing
these histories in a broader scientiﬁc, industrial, and medical
context, such as in relation to the ideas and practices that have
guided R&D (Green, 2007; Quirke, 2014). Informed by these
research strands, this paper explores how commercial and scientiﬁc
priorities appear to have converged and diverged during thender the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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ﬁrm Astra in 1982, but withdrawn the subsequent year because of
adverse neurological effects.
Zelmid represents the ﬁrst of the so-called selective serotonin
reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) to reach the market, years before
competing products such as blockbusters Prozac (ﬂuoxetine) and
Zoloft (sertraline) were marketed from the late 1980s. The
remarkable success of the SSRIs was followed by controversies
about efﬁcacy, safety and overtreatment (Healy, 2004). In turn,
these developments have sparked special interest in the history of
SSRIs (Healy, 1997; Moncrieff, 2008; Herzberg, 2010), and indeed of
antidepressants and depression in general (Rasmussen, 2008;
Shorter, 2009; Mulinari, 2012). However, from a social science
perspective, the history of Zelmid is interesting to scrutinize not
only because the drug happened to be the ﬁrst in a long series of
serotonin- (and proﬁt-) boosting antidepressants. Although it is
interesting to note how development of this drug was propelled by
a convergence of commercial and scientiﬁc interests that stimu-
lated the intermingling of industry and university research,
perhaps even more interesting is how such intermingling is said to
have resulted in tensions and outright conﬂict between commercial
and scientiﬁc priorities further along the trajectory of the drug.
In the following, this point is brought to the fore through micro-
level examination of the trajectory of Zelmid from the perspective
of the academic and industry scientists involved in its R&D. The
relevance of this analysis extends beyond the present case because,
as earlier research suggests, convergence as well as divergence of
scientiﬁc and commercial priorities may be general characteristics
of the current pharmaceutical innovation regime (Abraham, 2008).
2. Data source and research methods
Theoretically andmethodologically, this paper builds on a realist
conceptualization of interests (Abraham, 2008). Thus even though
the industry, as Vivian Quirke (2014; p.656) points out, “is neither
monolithic nor static, but e just as modern medicine e ﬂexible and
diverse” pharmaceutical companies are, as John Abraham (2008)
argues, still hierarchical organizations that have an objective,
though not always over-riding, commercial interest in proﬁt
maximization. By contrast, scientistse even those in the industrye
do not necessarily have commercial interests in R&D, and their
actions are likely inﬂuenced by intellectual, disciplinary and pro-
fessional motives. This is in part why the idea of managing or
prohibiting “conﬂict of interests” to minimize corporate bias makes
sense, as well as polices to increase or maintain the autonomy of
scientists, regulatory agencies and academic institutions vis-a-vis
industry (Thompson, 1993). Such a realist framework of interests
does not, however, assume that interests e and hence priorities e
always diverge between pharmaceutical companies and scientists
(or other actors). Nor does it assume that pharmaceutical com-
panies and scientists are solely motivated by commercial and sci-
entiﬁc interests, respectively. In fact because the relationship
between interests, actors and actions is not straightforward an
ongoing empirical challenge is to explore how various interests
converge and diverge in pharmaceutical R&D and how this impacts
on micro-level knowledge-claims, practices and controversies
pertaining to pharmaceuticals (e.g. Abraham, 2008).
Based on such a framework, the present paper represents an
effort to document the course of events in relation to Zelmid. To
that end, between 2010 and 2012 the author conducted ten semi-
structured interviews lasting from one to three hours with aca-
demic and industry scientists and management involved in its R&D
during various phases (experimental, pre-clinical and clinical). All
participants were informed beforehand that theywould not remain
anonymous and were asked to provide written informed consent,which everyone did. The study was approved by the Ethical Com-
mittee at Lund University, Sweden (no. 2010/274). Interviews were
tape recorded and transcribed. Transcripts were read comprehen-
sively and coded systematically according to relevance to the
research question: how commercial and scientiﬁc priorities
converged or diverged. In some cases, ambiguities were clariﬁed via
written correspondence. Oral reports have proved highly valuable
for investigating the history of psychopharmacology (Healy, 1997,
2002), but a well-known challenge facing oral reports is accuracy.
Multiple sources were therefore used to cross-check facts and
reconstruct the course of events. Besides interviews this includes
textual sources, such as scientiﬁc articles, memoirs and other
written accounts by involved individuals (Ross, 1998; Agurell,
2009), some of whom are now deceased (€Ostholm, 1995). It
should be noted however that with respect to the motives of the
corporate leadership the evidence was mainly gathered from texts
by the late Lars Werk€o (2000, 2003), a long-time member of Astra's
Board of Directors (1965e1985) and Executive Vice President and
Research Director of the company (1978e1985). Attempts to query
the Marketing Director responsible for Zelmid to get conﬁrmation
or alternative interpretations of events proved unsuccessful.
Consequently, the story is told from the perspective of key aca-
demic and industry scientists.
3. Background: synthesis of selective serotonin-boosting
antidepressants
By the mid-to-late 1960s, many psychopharmacologists had
come to consider noradrenaline as the critical neurotransmitter to
target for pharmacological treatment of depression (Mulinari,
2012). This belief was underpinned by ﬁndings that tricyclic anti-
depressants (TCA) block neuronal uptake of noradrenaline, and that
various other compounds that increase brain noradrenaline have
an antidepressant effect (Schildkraut and Kety, 1967). However, in
1968, pharmacology professor and subsequent Nobel laureate
Arvid Carlsson of Gothenburg University, Sweden, together with
colleagues from Karolinska Institutet in Stockholm, published a
seminal paper proposing that the TCA imipramine may alleviate
depression in part by blocking reuptake of the neurotransmitter
serotonin (Carlsson et al., 1968). In many ways, this proposal that
serotonin may be involved in the mood-elevating effect of TCAs set
the stage for the ensuing development of SSRIs in the 1970s and
1980s by almost every major pharmaceutical ﬁrm worldwide
(Healy, 1997).
Inspired by this original idea, Carlsson suggested ﬁrst to the
Swiss ﬁrm Geigy, the owners of clomipramine, the most serotonin-
selective TCAs tested, and then to the Astra subsidiary H€assle that
they develop selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors e subse-
quently SSRIs e for the treatment of depression. According to
Carlsson (2010; interview), only Astra H€assle showed immediate
interest and had already involved Carlsson in a partnership to work
on other projects, which entailed close collaboration between
Carlsson and the H€assle chemist Hans Corrodi (€Ostholm, 1995). The
continuing partnership would beneﬁt both parties: Astra would
own exclusive rights to any resultant compounds; Carlsson would
receive support to further develop the serotonin project and was
also guaranteed royalties from future sales (Carlsson, 2010;
interview).
At the time Astra's R&D operations were organized into four
independent subsidiaries (Sundling and Brennan, 2004). Three
subsidiaries were strategically located in proximity to Swedish
universities: H€assle in M€olndal outside of Gothenburg, Astra's
Research Laboratory (subsequently Astra Pharmaceuticals) in
S€odert€alje outside of Stockholm (where Astra headquarters was
also located), and Draco in Lund in southern Sweden. The fourth e
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clinical research laboratories, and devised its own product policy,
clinical trials and marketing strategy. However, the company ex-
ecutive board supervised activities and set the budgetary
frameworks.
It was together with two Astra H€assle chemistsd Hans Corrodi
and Peter Berntsson d that Carlsson proceeded to develop what
would become the ﬁrst marketed SSRI, Z-1-(4-bromophenyl)-1-(3-
pyridyl)-3-dimethylaminopropen, internally referred to as H102/09
(later zimelidine and then zimeldine, and marketed as Zelmid) in
his Gothenburg laboratory in 1971. Carlsson, Corrodi and Berntsson
began their work on a group of antihistamines (pheniramines) that
they found could block both serotonin and noradrenaline reuptake.
Among the pheniramines, they identiﬁed brompheniramine as the
most potent serotonin reuptake blocker, which they therefore
selected as the starting point for their synthesis program (Carlsson,
2010; interview). After a series of chemical modiﬁcations, the new
compound, H102/09, was created with selective and potent sero-
tonin reuptake blocking properties in vitro.
At this juncture, it is important to point out that Carlsson was
not alone in pushing for an SSRI in the late 1960s. Remarkably, in
S€odert€alje just outside Stockholm, less than 500 km from Gothen-
burg, Astra's Research Laboratory under the auspices of chief psy-
chopharmacologist Svante Ross had largely independently been
working on a similar project.
The origin of this project can be traced back to a 1967 publica-
tion where, in fact, Ross' team ﬁrst demonstrated the presence of a
serotonin reuptake mechanism in brain tissue (Ross and Renyi,
1967). The Astra researchers assessed serotonin reuptake by
exposing slices of mouse brain to radioactive (tritiated) serotonin
and then measuring how much radioactivity was incorporated.
Using this technique, they demonstrated the serotonin reuptake
blocking effect of various compounds, including aweak effect of the
TCA desipramine. Shortly thereafter, researchers from the much
larger US company Pﬁzer corroborated these ﬁndings (Blackburn
et al., 1967). Ross (2012; interview) explained to me: “Our discov-
ery was in itself not very remarkable, but it was important because
it showed that it was possible to develop SSRIs.”
To that end, they chose another chemical route for synthesizing
SSRIs than the route designed by Carlsson's team. They created so-
called rigid spiro compounds that were structurally related to the
TCA drug amitriptyline and that, based on previous experience,
they believed could be selective for one neurotransmitter reuptake
mechanism. However, because these compounds were difﬁcult to
synthesize, they also made biphenyl derivatives of these com-
pounds (Ross, 2012; interview). It turned out that the spiro com-
pounds were selective noradrenaline reuptake inhibitors, while the
biphenyl derivatives were somewhat selective for serotonin.
Among all these compounds, Ross and colleagues eventually
decided to conduct extensive tests on what they perceived as the
best candidate e PUB105 (compound no. 3a in (Carnmalm et al.,
1975)).
4. H102/09 and PUB105: results of a paradigm shift in drug
development
Thus around 1969e1970, both Ross' and Carlsson's teams had
initiated synthesis programs aimed at making a more serotonin-
selective antidepressant. Notably, both programs embodied the
idea that drug development should be directed by hypotheses
about how the targeting of a speciﬁc biological mechanism (e.g.
serotonin reuptake) may produce therapeutic value (e.g. antide-
pressant effect) e later referred to as rational drug discovery
(Adam, 2005). In psychopharmacology, such ideas were enabled by
the scientiﬁc advances of previous years regarding chemicalneurotransmission and the pharmacological effects of psychotro-
pics, as well as by developments in laboratory techniques, including
those based on radioactivity used by Ross and colleagues (Healy,
2002; Mulinari, 2012). However, as will be argued here, the
implementation of this more deductive approach to drug discovery
at Astra was also underpinned by converging scientiﬁc and com-
mercial interests in drug R&D, owing to the simultaneous promise
of proﬁts and medico-scientiﬁc advances.
Critically, the idea of synthesizing molecules that would affect a
predeﬁned biochemical target diverged from the principles previ-
ously employed by Astra and many other companies. In his mem-
oirs the late Ivan €Ostholm, Research Director at Astra H€assle
between 1959 and 1977, describes the old approach to drug
discovery:
“Each successful medicine developed in the laboratories of these
companies resulted from the synthesis by chemists of thousands
of new chemical compounds, followed by tests known as
screening. Following large standard programs, pharmacologists
observed the effects of these chemicals in animal experiments
to see whether they were worth testing as medicines. Between
5000 and 8000 substances could be tested before a useful
medicine was found (€Ostholm, 1995, p.32).”
The problemwith this approach, €Ostholm claimed in retrospect,
was ﬁrst that it required vast economic and technological re-
sources, and second that the drugs developed were often de-
rivatives of existing drugs and were therefore unlikely to represent
major therapeutic advances. Because Astra was a small enterprise
in the 1950s and 1960s, it lacked the resources to compete efﬁ-
ciently using this method of drug development. For Astra, €Ostholm
says, this situation created an incentive to embrace “rational” drug
discovery when the opportunity emerged i.e. when investigation of
pharmacological mechanisms at the cellular and molecular level
became possible (€Ostholm, 1995).
In S€odert€alje, Svante Ross played a central role in this paradigm
shift. Ross, who had recently earned a degree in physiology, began
to take an interest inmechanism-based drug discovery shortly after
being recruited in 1957 to Astra's brand new S€odert€alje research
laboratory during a research expansion phase (Ross, 1998). At Astra,
Ross was tasked with developing rodent tests to screen for psy-
chotropic effects of molecules synthesized by in-house chemists.
The results were quite discouraging; many molecules were syn-
thesized, but none seemed to have a behavioral proﬁle that war-
ranted clinical testing. Faced with such disheartening results, Ross
(2012; interview) says, he proposed implementing novel ideas of
“mechanism-based drug development”. This suggestion allegedly
gained support from the laboratory leadership, which was
searching for ways to improve the drug discovery process.
In S€odert€alje, the ﬁrst study directed by Ross to follow this
outline dates back to the early 1960s (Ross, 1998). It aimed at
identifying an inhibitor of the enzyme catechol-O-methyl trans-
ferase (COMT). Based on thework of Julius Axelrod (1957) in the US,
it was believed that COMT promoted inactivation of catecholamines
such as noradrenaline. Because the enzyme monoamine oxidase
(MAO) has a similar function, and because MAO inhibitors were
known antidepressants, Ross and colleagues decided to test
whether a COMT inhibitor would also be an antidepressant. It was
in this context that intra-company collaboration was ﬁrst estab-
lished between Ross in S€odert€alje and Corrodi in Gothenburg, the
Astra H€assle chemist working with Arvid Carlsson. However,
despite shared interest in mechanism-based drug development,
they agreed to pursue research independently. This, Ross explained,
was largely because he wanted the freedom to use his industry
work in an academic context for his doctoral thesis (personal
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plinary interests even among industry scientists.
The COMT inhibitor project was soon abandoned because it
turned out that COMT inhibition did not have the pharmacological
effect that researchers were looking for. Moreover, Axelrod had
shown that, actually, neuronal reuptake was the vital mechanism
regulating synaptic noradrenaline levels (Axelrod et al., 1961), for
which he later received the Nobel Prize. However, adhering to the
“rational” drug discovery paradigm, Ross' team immediately began
to focus on ﬁnding molecules that would inﬂuence noradrenaline
reuptake (Ross, 2012; interview). For this, they used a technique to
measure uptake of radioactively labeled noradrenaline into brain
slices.
Then, during this work, an idea emerged that perhaps reuptake
of serotonin in the brain could bemeasured, tooe a concept not yet
described in the literature (although serotonin reuptake in non-
neuronal tissue was described by Axelrod in 1963). The availabil-
ity of highly active radioactive serotonin enabled Ross and col-
leagues to test this idea, and they found that, indeed, there was
active reuptake of serotonin in the brain (Ross and Renyi, 1967).
Inspired by this ﬁnding and by suggestions from others e notably
that serotonin may be involved in the mood-elevating effect of
TCAs (Carlsson et al., 1968), or even in the pathophysiology of
depression (Coppen, 1967) e they began to synthesize molecules
that may act as selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors as described
above.
While in S€odert€alje the shift toward mechanism-based drug
discovery thus seems to have been an endogenous process that
started sometime in the early 1960s, at Astra H€assle the former
Research Manager €Ostholm (1995) has related that this line of
research was established in 1961 after a meeting with Arvid
Carlsson during which Carlsson suggested that H€assle should
develop drugs targeting known biological mechanisms. According
to €Ostholm, Carlsson's recommendations and his subsequent
involvement with H€assle became the turning point for the Astra
subsidiary, which now shifted its R&D approach from a chemical to
a biological pathway. Thus, in the coming years, a number of
original compounds were created at the nexus of industry and
academia based on this philosophy; in addition to zimelidine, the
best-sellers metoprolol to treat cardiovascular disorders and
omeprazole to treat peptic ulcer that transformed Astra into a
highly proﬁtable global company in the early 1990s.
It is important to point out that Astra was not alone in pursuing
the new paradigm of mechanism-based drug discovery in the
1960s. Rather, as Ross explained to me, prominent psychophar-
macology researchers, such as Axelrod and Carlsson, had advanced
such ideas beginning in the latter half of the 1950s and similar ideas
were informing research in other disease areas (Adam, 2005).
Nonetheless, as late as the early 1980s, some major pharmaceutical
companies still relied on large synthesis and screening programs.
This is evident from the following British Medical Journal excerpt
from a 1982 symposium report e Decision Making in Drug Research
e with representatives of major drug companies, universities and
government institutions:
“One stimulating concept advanced at the meeting was an
attempt to create new drugs by starting from a biological hy-
pothesis and making use of new chemical substances to eluci-
date pharmacological or biological mechanisms. Such an
integration of pathophysiological and pharmacological ap-
proaches may lead to new types of drugs (Gross, 1982, p.1444).”
Arguably, the implementation of mechanism-based drug dis-
covery from the early 1960s portrayed above, which led up to the
attempt to develop SSRIs from the late 1960s by both Ross' andCarlsson's teams, was enabled by the convergence of commercial
and scientiﬁc interests. Consistent with this, Astra H€assle's
Research Director €Ostholm claims that the recognition that Astra
needed new avenues for drug discovery drove him to seek help
from, and embrace the ideas of university researchers specialized in
pharmacology and experimental medicine, most notably Arvid
Carlsson (€Ostholm, 1995). Conversely, according to Carlsson (2010;
interview), the curiosity about creating and testing the effect of an
SSRI (and other “rationally” designed drugs) drove him to seek help
from drug companies despite being generally skeptical of the
industry's scientiﬁc conduct. Similarly, the Astra scientists in
S€odert€alje say they chose to develop an SSRI not for personal or
corporate ﬁnancial gain, but because the creation of an SSRI was
appealing from a scientiﬁc perspective. Indeed, according to Ross, a
principal impetus for the Astra scientists was to contribute to the
advancement of psychopharmacology and, probably also, to propel
their own scientiﬁc status, which entailed publishing ﬁndings in
traditional academic fora.
5. The metabolite norzimelidine: tensions between scientiﬁc
and commercial priorities
In the early 1970s, Astra still had two antidepressant projects
running in parallel. However, the company realized that it lacked
the resources to simultaneously push two antidepressants through
the testing required by authorities for approval (Werk€o, 2003).
Therefore, a decision was taken to carry out a comparison of
PUB105 and H102/09 with the aim of discarding one of them. The
results were presented at a big meeting in 1971 with representa-
tives from both project teams where it was decided to discard
PUB105 (Ross, 1998). According to Sven Ove €Ogren (2011; inter-
view) e who was recruited to Astra in S€odertalje in 1968 to test
candidate psychopharmacological substances in animal models,
and who one year later assumed responsibility for the PUB105
project (when Ross left to pursue academic work in the US for one
year, including six months in Axelrod's lab) e one major reason for
selecting H102/09 was that it appeared to be less toxic. Moreover,
H102/09 was much more serotonin selective. As Ross (1998) later
explained, this decision was therefore rational from a scientiﬁc
standpoint insofar as the whole idea was to create a selective se-
rotonin reuptake blocker.
Around this time, the perceived need to concentrate resources
also underpinned major company-wide organizational changes
(Werk€o, 2003; Sundling and Brennan, 2004). Notably, this included
concentrating all brain research to Astra Pharmaceuticals in
S€odert€alje including the H102/09 project e now formally zimeli-
dine. In the mid-1970s, following completion of pre-clinical studies
in S€odert€alje, as well as initial testing on healthy volunteers (Ross,
1998), Astra Pharmaceuticals commissioned clinicians to test
zimelidine on patients (Benkert et al., 1977). In one trial, organized
by clinical pharmacologist Folke Sj€oqvist at Karolinska Institutet,
the drug was given to 6 depressed patients in doses of 25e150 mg
twice daily for about 3 weeks (Siwers et al., 1977). The scientists
veriﬁed that zimelidine was a selective serotonin reuptake inhibi-
tor. However, they also noted that zimelidine metabolized to nor-
zimelidine, which prompted Sj€oqvist to suggest to Astra
Pharmaceuticals that they assess the therapeutic value of norzi-
melidine e a suggestion, he says, to which researchers at the sub-
sidiary never responded (Sj€oqvist, 2011; interview).
The ﬁnding that zimelidine metabolized into norzimelidine was
far from unexpected, however. Shortly after the project's transfer to
S€odert€alje, Astra Pharmaceuticals' preclinical team realized that
zimelidine was a pro-drug (i.e. it had to be metabolized to be
therapeutically active) and that norzimelidine explained much of
the drug's effect in animal models (Ross and Renyi, 1977). However,
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zimelidine, when comparing their overall pharmacological prop-
erties (€Ogren et al., 1981). Both compounds are serotonin reuptake
blockers, and after oral administration of the same doses to rats,
zimelidine and norzimelidine did not differ signiﬁcantly in their
ability to block serotonin uptake (Ross and Renyi, 1977). Sven Ove
€Ogren ewho took command of the project in 1974 after the death
of the previous project supervisor, the Zelmid co-inventor Hans
Corrodi e explained retrospectively:
“The metabolism of zimelidine resulted in a molecule [norzi-
melidine] which was serotonin selective, but with higher
plasma and brain concentrations than zimelidine. This differs
from the TCAs, inwhich the main metabolites are noradrenaline
selective … so that selectivity was maintained after meta-
bolism.” (€Ogren, 2011; interview)
However, from a pharmacokinetic perspective norzimelidine
may still be preferable to zimelidine because patients may vary in
their ability to metabolize zimelidine (Sj€oqvist, 2011; interview).
Moreover, €Ogren (2011; interview) notes that the toxicological
proﬁles of the two compounds may differ; but this was never
properly tested, in part due to lack of support from corporate
management, €Ogren claims.
For Ross this decision was at least partly motivated by com-
mercial considerations: “It was considered to be too late to replace
zimeldine since several other pharmaceutical companies were
nipping at our heels” (personal communication). This was consis-
tent with the explanation of Lars Werk€o (2003) e Executive Vice
President and Research Director of the Astra Group 1978e1985 e
that Astra felt that the norzimelidine patent was far too close to
expiration to justify further studies, which Sj€oqvist (2011; inter-
view) stressed would have been sensible from a strictly scientiﬁc
perspective. However, from a ﬁnancial perspective, focusing efforts
on getting zimelidine to market was considered the better option,
Werk€o (2003) claims.
6. Indication and dose: clashes between commercial and
scientiﬁc priorities
After encouraging results in small clinical trials, zimelidine
advanced to controlled studies for ﬁnal evaluation in endogenous
depressions. From 1977 onward, trials were conducted in various
European countries, as well as in Australia and Canada (Sundling
and Brennan, 2004). Psychiatrist Jan Wålinder in Gothenburg
conducted one of the trials in collaboration with Arvid Carlsson. At
the time, Wålinder (2011; interview) explained to me, endogenous
depression (as opposed to reactive) was conceptualized as a severe
psychiatric disorder without apparent external cause, characterized
not only by depressed mood, but also by a diurnal pattern in which
symptoms predominate late at night and in the mornings. In
addition, elements of psychomotor retardation should be present.
However, the disorder was so rare that investigators were only able
to recruit about twelve new patients per year to the trial. Indeed,
recalled Stig Agurell (2011; interview) e Research Director of Astra
Pharmaceuticals during this time and later President of Astra
Pharmaceuticals e the difﬁculties in recruiting sufﬁcient numbers
of suitable patients with endogenous depression was a major
problem across the board.
Notwithstanding such problems, the overall results from the
clinical studies suggested that zimelidine was at least as effective as
comparator drugs, but better tolerated by patients (e.g. (Wålinder
et al., 1981; Loudon et al., 1981; Montgomery et al., 1981)). On
this basis, Astra decided to register the drug for endogenous
depression. But here something contentious happened that wouldbecome the epicenter of subsequent controversies. Astra decided to
seek approval for a uniform daily dose of 200 mg. The company also
decided no step-wise dose increment was to be suggested, which
was routine for antidepressants on the market (Werk€o, 2003). In
other words, all patients would receive the 200 mg dose from the
ﬁrst day of treatment. This dosage strategy was employed in some
trials (Montgomery et al., 1981). However, in general practice trials,
researchers were often more cautious and administered a lower
100 mg dose throughout the entire trial (Delia et al., 1981), or
during the ﬁrst two weeks, and only then stepped up to the full
dose (Loudon et al., 1981). Similarly, in the Gothenburg trial
directed byWålinder, patients were started on 100 mg daily, which
was increased after three days to 200 mg divided into two equal
doses (Wålinder et al., 1981).
According to €Ogren, the idea of uniform dosing was strongly
promoted by marketing executives e despite resistance from
company scientists, who stressed that this was inconsistent with
current practice. As €Ogren (2011; interview) recalls, “the message
came down that if the full dose could not be given from day one,
they would not be interested in launching the product.” Moreover,
€Ogren says, company management was not open to the possibility
of making a proper doseeresponse curve for the drug's clinical
effect, which meant that the optimal dose remained unknown.
However, based on available animal data, the optimal clinical dose
of Zelmid was predicted to be lower than 200 mg (€Ogren, 2011;
interview).
Astra presented the idea of the uniform 200 mg dose at a con-
ference held in Greece in April of 1980 (Carlsson et al., 1981). Most
delegates seemed to respond favorably to Astra's proposal (Agurell,
2011; interview). But not everyone was satisﬁed: Arvid Carlsson,
Stuart Montgomery, and Jan Wålinder, all of whom had been
involved in key trials, felt that Astra had set the dose too high
(Carlsson, 2010; Wålinder, 2011; interview). The underlying reason
was some evidence that the therapeutic effect was compromised
when plasma levels of zimelidine and norzimelidine reached a
certain threshold (Montgomery et al., 1981; Wålinder et al., 1981).
ForWålinder et al. (1981), this indicated that the “daily dose chosen
in the present study, i.e. the recommended 200 mg, may be
somewhat too high.”Montgomery et al. (1981), however, restricted
their recommendation of a lower dose to older patients. Several
years later Stig Agurell (2009), the Research Director of Astra
Pharmaceuticals, also pointed to some evidence that adverse drug
reactions were less frequent when the dose was reduced to 100 mg
daily, increased in a step-wise manner, or administered in two
separate doses of 100 mg each. But according to Carlsson (2010;
interview) and Wålinder (2011; interview), discussions centered
less on the risk of adverse effects than on the risk of losing thera-
peutic efﬁcacy. In light of the available data, they claim to have
recommended that Astra sort out the existing dose-related un-
certainties, just as €Ogren had allegedly done earlier. This position is
supported by the written account provided by Werk€o (2003).
Wålinder (2011; interview) explained:
“We soon became aware that Astra had recommended doses
that were not at all consistent with what we had seen. If one
were to be critical, you could say that it was a way to recoup
invested research money. Arvid and I went up and met with the
Astra Board of Directors and said that they have to calm things
down. This was after the Corfu conference, where we began to
suspect that they were being too aggressive in their marketing.”
According to Wålinder (2011; interview), they also requested
that the company defer promotion of the drug to general practi-
tioners until proper testing had been completed.
S. Mulinari / Social Science & Medicine 138 (2015) 217e224222“From the onset, we were highly committed to the idea that
before we have enough experience, this substance should be
limited to use by psychiatrists. Should we accumulate evidence
over time that this works, we will gradually shuttle it into pri-
mary care. But until such time, it stays within the realm of the
psychiatric specialist. And this is where Astra was unable to
resist and ventured out into primary care.”
The Astra leadership apparently disregarded such opinions (but
seemingly accepted the suggestion of a lower dose for the elderly).
For some reason, so did the pharmaceutical authorities e Astra's
application was given the green light.
But why was a single, higher dose of such importance to Astra?
Werk€o (2003)ewhowas part of the Astra managemente gives the
following answer: company management believed that a simple
dosage schemewas the key to the large and proﬁtable primary care
market. To achieve this goal it was important to “not complicate
treatment” (p.104). In his memoirs Werk€o (2000) wrote: “The
important question of dose and treatment initiation was not a
medical issue, but came to be determined by those who would
convince the market (or the prescribing doctors) of treatment
excellence” (p.364).
Astra is also said to have rejected requests from scientists for
additional clinical trials (Werk€o, 2003; Carlsson, 2010; interview).
The Astra leadership might have felt that producing more data only
meant losing time. Another factor was a newly signed agreement
with drug giant Merck, at that point the world's largest pharma-
ceutical corporation, which wanted to sell Zelmid in the US (Werk€o,
2003). Licensing the drug to Merck opened a new ﬁnancial pano-
rama for Astra, which at that timewas a peripheral drug ﬁrm on the
global scene (Sundling and Brennan, 2004). It is difﬁcult to say
whether things would have been different had Astra taken the
criticism seriously. In any case, they did not. In 1982, Zelmid was
introduced in Sweden and several other countries, including the UK
and Germany.7. The rise and fall of Zelmid
Already a few months post-launch, Zelmid became associated
with a few cases of hypersensitivity reactions resulting in fever and
muscle pain (Agurell, 2009). This was not unexpected. The drug
information sheet contained the following statement: “Cases of
hypersensitivity reactions (1%) including symptoms such as fever,
muscle and joint pain … have been reported” (Astra, 1983). How-
ever, within about one year, reports of potentially fatal side effects
surfaced (Agurell, 2009). By the spring of 1983, reports of a ﬂu-like
condition began to arrive, sometimes accompanied by muscle
cramps, liver dysfunction and a few cases of GuillaineBarre, a
potentially fatal neurological disorder. In May of 1983, Swedish
pharmaceutical authorities issued a warning regarding potentially
serious adverse effects. Among an estimated 25 000 patients
treated with Zelmid, authorities afﬁrmed 80 likely cases of this
inﬂuenza-like syndrome, sometimes with neurological complica-
tions, but believed the true ﬁgure could be much higher because of
reporting bias (Anonymous, 1983). Given the seriousness of the
situation, they raised concerns that “in just a short period, based on
various indications a large number of patients had been exposed to
this new chemical compound” (p.2034). They required doctors to
immediately report suspected cases of Zelmid-induced hypersen-
sitivity reactions, and to desist from off-label prescribing: “Zelmid
should primarily be prescribed by psychiatric specialists based on
strict indications” (Anonymous, 1983, p.2034).
The Swedish pharmaceutical authorities were not alone in
raising concerns. A month later, in June of 1983, British authoritiesinformed Astra that they intended to withdraw the drug because of
its side effects (Sundling and Brennan, 2004). But despite the
anxiety of authorities, Astra's executive management at ﬁrst
seemed not to want the drug to be recalled (Sundling and Brennan,
2004). However, when additional cases of GuillaineBarre surfaced,
on September 15, 1983, following an internal investigation, Astra
decided towithdraw the drug globally beforeMerck had the chance
to release it in the US (Agurell, 2009). According to Stig Agurell
(2009) e who attended the meeting where the withdrawal deci-
sion was taken e the President of the Astra Group asked everyone
present to lay any commercial considerations aside, which resulted
in unanimous support for withdrawal. Possibly, under threats of
forced withdrawal and with mounting medical concerns, resisting
withdrawal could have been perceived as a risky commercial
strategy that could have severely damaged the company's
reputation.
At the time of withdrawal Zelmid had been prescribed to more
than 200 000 patients, which in 1983 represented an astonishing
ﬁgure for an antidepressant produced by a minor player. In Sweden
alone, the ﬁgure was about 75 000 patients, representing 40
percent of the antidepressant market (Sundling and Brennan,
2004). It was later estimated that at least 1 in 10 000 treated
with zimelidine would develop GuillaineBarre, compared with a
“spontaneous” occurrence rate of 1 in 50 000. To this day how the
drug causes such effects remains unclear, although an immuno-
logical process unrelated to the drug's serotonin reuptake blocking
effect seems likely (Bengtsson, 1992). Some evidence also suggests
that such severe adverse reactions are dose-dependent, which has
naturally triggered discussions about whether they could have
been avoided (Werk€o, 2003). However, of the 80 cases reported to
Swedish pharmaceutical authorities in 1982,17 had received a daily
dose of 100 mg (Anonymous, 1983), suggesting that although
administration of the lower dose could perhaps have reduced the
number of such serious adverse events, they would not have been
completely avoided.
Still, how could Zelmid have become so widely prescribed in
such a short period of time? According to Jan Wålinder (2011;
interview) and Marie Åsberg (2010; interview) e two of Sweden's
most inﬂuential psychiatrists at the time e part of the explanation
is that doctors perceived Zelmid to be convenient, safe and effective
compared with existing medications. However, Åsberg and
Wålinder also hold that aggressive marketing inﬂuenced doctors to
prescribe the drug. For example, Åsberg (2010; interview) recol-
lected how sales representatives promoted the drug to general
practice physicians by stressing the limited side effect proﬁle and
that, unlike TCAs, patients could not commit suicide by overdosing.
This sentiment is supported by other accounts; Werk€o (2003)
retrospectively portrayed Astra's marketing as “overwhelming”
(p.105), while journalist Ingrid Carlberg (2008) described some of
the marketing strategies, including free lunches, trips, and gifts to
doctors. In this respect the Zelmid story previewed subsequent SSRI
marketing strategies, albeit in milder form (Healy, 2004;
Zetterqvist and Mulinari, 2013). Indeed, commentators have
noted how Zelmid's extraordinary yet brief success became an eye-
opener for many larger companies with similar drugs in the pipe-
line (Healy, 2004; Shorter, 2009). Insofar as that is correct, this
study suggests that Astra may have paved the way by showing
competitors how intense marketing and a simple dosage scheme
opened the golden gates to the vast primary care market.
8. Conclusion
The development of Zelmid over almost a 15-year period was
contingent on dynamic interactions between academic scientists,
industry scientists and researchmanagement. As the above account
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gence and divergence between commercial and scientiﬁc priorities
at distinct points along the drug's trajectory. Arguably, the
convergence of commercial and scientiﬁc priorities underpinned
the push toward mechanism-based drug discovery from the early
1960s following important innovations in laboratory techniques
and the simultaneous promises of medico-scientiﬁc advances and
proﬁts. However, the Zelmid story also suggests that the inter-
mingling of science and commerce was far from unproblematic.
Thus, along Zelmid's trajectory, scientiﬁc and commercial priorities
also appear to have diverged at various points, sometimes even
resulting in conﬂict. On such occasions it is pertinent to note that a
power asymmetry is apparent in the narratives of scientists: com-
mercial considerations appear to have trumped those of science
since the power to decide ultimately rests with corporate man-
agement, not with scientists. Accordingly, corporate concerns with
patent expiration were said to have underpinned the decision not
to pursue thorough investigation into themetabolite norzimelidine
despite scientists' interests. However, perhaps this is most apparent
concerning the issues related to dosage and to drug use in primary
care, where corporate management allegedly took decisions con-
trary to the recommendations of both academic and company
scientists.
A striking feature of this story is how such still-lingering sci-
entiﬁc doubts had seemingly little impact on Zelmid's reception
among health care professionals; physicians even prescribed Zel-
mid off-label (i.e. for non-endogenous depression). Although Astra
supported a wide use of the drug by hefty marketing it would be
unwise to reduce physicians' behavior to an outcome of marketing.
As pointed out by Green (2007) physicians often make pragmatic
treatment choices, and like subsequent SSRIs Zelmid was more
convenient than existing antidepressants due to its simple dosage
and the low risk for suicide by overdosing.
A limitation in the present analysis is that the emphasis on in-
terests may have resulted in the downplaying of other factors that
possibly contributed to disagreements, for example communica-
tion gaps or the various technical, legal, regulatory, organizational
or ﬁnancial constraints that actors faced. Indeed, interest expla-
nations should not be considered exhaustive (Abraham, 2008),
although they may be particularly apt for studies of corporate sci-
ence (Sismondo, 2011). Moreover, by relying heavily on interviews
many years after the fact there is a risk that scientists' intellectual
concerns are being idealized and commercial pressures and in-
centives downplayed. Arvid Carlsson, for example, was entitled to
royalties from Zelmid sales, but when queried about this responded
that his motivationwas always scientiﬁc as opposed to commercial,
citing the dosage controversy to support this. As studies of conﬂict
of interests in medical research emphasize, researchers in both
industry and academia may be inﬂuenced by multiple and some-
times conﬂicting interests, including intellectual and commercial
interests (Thompson, 1993). This study does not question the
relevance of such potentially conﬂicting interests within single
actors; rather it highlights how priorities converge and diverge also
between actors.
The notion of converging or diverging priorities between actors
is not new. Such ideas have, for example, emerged form and
informed previous historical analyses of pharmaceutical innovation
(e.g. Green, 2007; Quirke, 2014) and regulation (e.g. Abraham,
2008; Tobbell, 2012). What this study adds to this literature is to
suggest a temporality in the divergence of commercial and scientiﬁc
priorities. Divergence was rare during the experimental and pre-
clinical phases (although there may have been some tension, as the
norzimelidine example suggests), but became concentrated
downstream during clinical testing and post-marketing. This may
partly reﬂect the fact that experimental and preclinical research atAstra at that time was decentralized where, Ross (1998) writes,
“initiatives were still at the laboratory level” (p.7) and where local
research management, €Ostholm (1995) submits, was not “depen-
dent on support from the company's marketing experts when
choosing projects and deciding which compounds should be used
for clinical trials” (p.152), as was, he argues, common practice in
other companies.
This alignment of R&D and marketing (e.g. Green, 2007; Dumit,
2012) together with some recent changes in the research organi-
zation of companies (e.g. outsourcing and offshoring) (Petryna,
2009) could admittedly challenge the present-day relevance of
this case study. On the other hand, drug developers of today face
some of the same scientiﬁc and regulatory challenges as did Astra
in the 1970s and 1980s, such as a need to investigate drugs' phar-
macological and toxicological proﬁles and organize a sequence of
pre-clinical and clinical studies to gain market access. Moreover, as
in the 1970s and 1980s, corporate ﬁnancial investment and proﬁt
prospects grow intensely along a drug's trajectory, meaning that
awareness and involvement by higher levels of management will
typically be greatest in the late project phases. Also, the current
market incentive structure, as conditioned for example by patent
rules, ensure that it is in the ﬁrm's interest to swiftly increase the
size of the potential market, for example through heavy marketing
(OECD, 2009), which provides fertile ground for mismatches be-
tween scientiﬁc and (especially short-term) commercial priorities.
Therefore, it may be possible to discern a similar pattern of
convergence and divergence of priorities in the trajectory of other
drugs. Consistent with this idea, the literature on the conduct of
drug companies is densely packed with examples of companies
that ignore scientiﬁc concerns during the clinical and post-
marketing phases (e.g. Dukes et al., 2014), whereas examples
from the experimental and preclinical phases are far less common
(however see, Abraham and Ballinger (2012)). This may not only be
because the experimental and preclinical phases are less open to
scrutiny, but may also reﬂect the actual nature of drug R&D. Spe-
ciﬁcally, ignoring scientiﬁc concerns in the experimental and pre-
clinical phases may come at a high cost, since a company that
heavily invests in a project with inherent scientiﬁc ﬂaws is likely to
pay dearly downstream during the R&D process. In stark contrast,
too much credence given to scientiﬁc concerns during the clinical
testing and post-marketing phases may also pose ﬁnancial risk
since it could delay, restrict or even hinder market access.
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